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Abstract  
The worldwide colossal failures of financial institutions in the wake of the 2007–2010 financial turmoil the 
yesteryear advocates of liberalization and privatization converted almost overnight into vocal supporters of raising 
the safety walls around the interests of various stakeholders, especially the depositors. Admittedly, it was the 
heightened lure of leverage gains that led the financial institutions to expand credit beyond what the volume and 
quality of their capital assets warranted without crossing the limits of safety. The devastation led to a paradigm 
shift, so to say, at the national and international level in finance focusing on liquidity coverage of obligations that 
financial institutions must maintain for their own safety as also in the wider social interest. Stringent and regular 
watch was needed; it was felt, to ensure the compliance.  The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), an 
organ of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) developed what are known as Accords i.e. agreements defining 
capital and its adequacy for banks to keep the risk they could take within limits of safety. It is interesting to find that 
Malaysia was in a sense predictive of events that unfolded to revamp and strengthen its own regulatory framework. 
Also, the IFSB was alert to announce some new standards. This paper attempts a critical appraisal of these 
developments with a view to assess how far Islamic banks really need Basel Accords and are likely to absorb them 
without being cumbersome. 
 
Key words: Islamic finance; Capital Adequacy; Basel Accords; Shari’ah compliance; Bank Negara action. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. Introduction: the ailment 
 
In an economy, the entities that save money out of their current incomes are largely not the same 
as need money for a variety of uses, especially for business. Financial institutions, dominantly 
banks, operate as intermediaries between the savers and the users of money. They collect large 
and small amounts from the savers in the form of deposits and advance the same as loans to those 
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                    Figure 1: Financial Intermediation 
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who need financing. The revenue banks earn from their lending operations minus what they pay 
to attract cash deposits constitutes the bank margins. From this gross income banks take out their 
operatingexpensesto arrive at the net profit for their owners
2
. Collectively, these profits are the 
cost that society has to pay to the banking system for performing the mediation function so vital 
for wealth creation and distribution. Figure 1 above depicts how financial intermediation works.        
The banks usein their lending activities not only the cash deposited with them; they also create 
credit-on-creditwhich the conventional fractional reserve system so liberally facilitates. Credit 
depositsequal the cash holdings of a bank multiplied by the reciprocal of the reserve ratio minus 
the cash base of credit creation
2
. This base is enhanced by the technique we call as maturity 
transformation
3
. 
 
 
Not banks alone but their business clients too gain by multiple credit expansion. For, they 
enhance profits for their stakeholders through leveraging on equity as long as the schedule of 
expected profits runs above the schedule of interest rates (that is until the bubble bursts). 
Thus, credit expansion is extra attractive for boththe parties – banks and the business clients. But 
for the same reason banking also becomes an extra risky venture. The profit lure has frequently 
led to over-expansion of credit coupled with reckless speculative borrowings; the process 
eventually culminating in financial crashes, big or small.  
Certain developments the wave of liberalization initiated during the decades before the turn of 
the century persistently pushed the leveraging lure beyond the limits of sustainability. Caution in 
both credit expansion and borrowings gave way to adventurism that ended in the onset of the 
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 If R is the risk-free rate of interest and α the risk premium, the rate of interest charged on loans RL will be 
determined as follows Rl =(R + α). Likewise, if risk discount rate β is the rate of interest RD on deposits would be 
expressed as RD = (R – β). The formulations will yield gross bank margins as equal to RL - RD= (R + α) - (R –β) = (α 
+ β) where α need not be equal to β. [(α + β) /total assets] gives the margin coefficient for inter bank profitability 
comparisons.  However, in the Islamic Profit and Loss Sharing system, why should R be discounted is tenuous.  
3
 Commercial banks normally grant short-term loans of three months duration. Business transforms them into long 
term through a renewal or roll over process which benefits banks as well. 
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Figure 2: Leveraging magnifies returns on shareholders‟ equity 
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2007–2010 financial crises the like of which the world had seldom experienced before. The 
turmoil continues unabated in a unique go-halt-go mode; today is highelation in the Wall 
Street,tomorrow a deepening gloom. 
Colossal has been the failures of banks, insurance companies and investment house across the 
globe. Wild and wide have been the devastations; chaos and despair unparalleled
4
. Indeed, the 
experience has caused a distinct paradigm shift in financial economics. The yesteryears 
advocates of liberalization and privatization have turned almost overnight into vocal pleaders for 
raising the safety walls to protect the stakeholders, especially the depositors
5
.  
      The existing conventional regulations of financial institutions are being tightened at the local 
and international levelsvia what we have come to know as the Basel Accords. The measures they 
contain focus on strengthening the balance sheet structures of financial institutions. The specify 
capital adequacy requirements for these institutions, banks specially, and insist on there 
observance with a view to improving their resistance to future crises especially in times of the 
run on bank deposits. Interestingly, the Accords maintain silence on credit creation and control 
measures. Since this paper is meant to look at Basel Accords from the viewpoint of Islamic 
banks, a few preliminary observations may not be out of place.  
To begin with, Islamic banking is a tiny fraction of the gigantic world financial system: Islamic 
banks held less than 1% of the global banking assets by the end of 2013. Their areas of 
operation, socio-economic environment, trading modes and instruments used are much different 
from the Basel Accords‟ underpinnings. Again, these Accords are structured to protect 
conventional banks in future against the possible damage of the sort the current turmoil has 
inflicted on them. It is widely claimed that the impact of the crisis on Islamic banks was 
negligible due to the in-built strength of the system, especially the firm linkage between the 
money and real values. . If this claim is true,to what extent would Islamic banks need to 
implement the Basel Accords?  Finally, Islamic banks have to meet Shari‟ah obligations 
restrictive of indulgence in over-risky transactions. Why then put additional burden on them? 
      To ponder on such questions and search for answers, a brief background to Basel Accords 
and what they seek to do maybe helpful.  
 
2. Basel Accords 
 
A chronic capital insufficiency to cover the mounting debt default risks has increasingly been 
cited as the primary source of agony the world frequently passes through because of recurrent 
financial crises. The predicament has led to focus on defining capital more precisely and fix the 
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 (The) falling U.S. housing prices and rising delinquencies on the residential mortgage market could lead to losses 
of $565 billion dollars. When combining these factors with losses from other categories of loans originated and 
securities issued in the United States related to commercial real estate, potential losses were put at about $945 
billion. The $945 billion estimate of losses, represents approximately $142 per person worldwide and 4 percent of 
the $23.21-trillion credit market. Global banks were likely to carry about half of these losses. The loss figure $945 
billion is just an estimate; actual amount may even be higher. IMF Global Financial Stability Report released on 
April 8, 2008. 
5
 Under Basel Accords, in the event of a winding-up, depositors' funds rank in priority before capital, so depositors 
woul d only lose money if the bank makes a loss which exceeds the amount of capital it has. 
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levels of its adequacy the financial institution must candidly observe for their own safety as also 
in the wider societal interest. In a fast-changing world of finance, a regular watch over the 
systemic liquidity was needed to make the security concepts work effectively without impairing 
economic dynamism.  
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), an organ of the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS),has long been made responsible for keeping the all important watch. The 
Committee is a group of eleven developed countries – G 10 + Spain 6 . The work of the 
Committee is to harmonize banking standards and regulations within and between countries, 
especially to see that no foreign banking institutions of the group could avoid or evade 
supervision. Thus, the Committee was an exclusivist organization in its very origin and so it 
continues to remain. 
 To promote its objectives, the Committee has developed the concept of capital 
adequacy(requirement)for banks
7
. It defines capital adequacy norms for individual institutions. 
Each bank has to fulfil the requirements that the Committee defines specifically for it. 
Individualization of institutions sharpens not only the exclusivity of the Committee but may also 
put its transparency in treating different banks under the scanner. If the scope of the Committee 
operations is to be seen as truly internationalised, the possibility of discriminatory treatment has 
to be eliminated. Globalization demands inclusion of additional countries in the Committee for 
ensuring air deal. Present Accords do grant ample discretionary latitude to non-members but the 
range and content of its recommendations may not uniformly be conducive to all. There is room 
for oligarchic decision structuresto eventually become a fait accompli applicable without 
distinction in course of time. Indeed some writings seem to imply that the process is already on 
(Hawser 2014,1) 
The BCBS has issued three Accords on capital adequacy since 1988. They contain  standards 
that individual banks have to implement across the globe. The centre of attention in developing 
these standards has understandably been the eagerness to impart stability to the financial system  
tobanish the recurrence of financial crises that confront the world so often. The Accords are too 
elaborate and technical in details for the ordinary bank employees and their clients. We shall 
focus on their generic thrust and policy direction in the text; the reader may find technical details 
with illustrations in Appendix 1.   We may begin with an explanation ofcapital adequacy - the 
common thread that runs through these Accords. 
 
Capital Adequacy: the risk-weighted approach 
As explained above the primary objective of Basel Accords is to ensure adequate liquidity 
available in each bank to face abnormal withdrawals at critical times. This needs expeditious 
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The group includes France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, the US and 
Luxembourg (G-10) in addition to Spain. 
7
 Capital inadequacy refers to the possibility of a financial institution being hurt by an unexpected loss. To ward off 
such an eventuality, Basel 1 categorizes the assets of these institutions with reference to such a risk into five 
categories (0%, 10%, 20%, 50%, 100%). Banks that operate internationally are required to have capital adequacy – a 
minimum of capital - that would keep the weight of such risk at 8% or less Basel II modified the categorization.. 
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asset management. Assets are classified according to the difference in the degree of risk(loss in 
value) they carry; that degree determines the comparative quality status of each class. This 
degree varies with the ease and speed with which an asset can be converted into another, 
particularly in cash. The assets that carry low degree of risk in this sense are of high quality and 
those which carry high riskare of low quality. Holding cash carries zero risk and so is almost the 
case with government securities; thus both are regarded high quality assets. In contrast, assets 
like residential mortgages carry higher risk; their asset quality is low. Similarly, assets, such as 
debentures (corporate bonds for long-term financing), are assigned a higher weight and are 
included in lower class assets. It comes about that risk-weight varies inversely with asset quality. 
We take the risk-weighted aggregate of all bank assets as a measure of a bank‟s overall risk 
exposure. We check if a bank has capital (liquidity) at least equal to this aggregate. For this 
purpose, Basel Accords define four capital categories called the „tiers. Presently we identify two 
of the categories called as Tier 1 and Tier 2. A capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is calculated for 
each bank as follows. 
 
 
 
Tier 1 capital is that which is permanently and freely available to absorb losses without making 
the bank cease operating. For example, it includes ordinary share capital (equity) of the bank 
excluding revaluation reserves. Tier 1 capital is important because it protects both the survival of 
the bank and the stability of the financial system. 
Tier2 capital has items which generally absorb losses only in the event of bank liquidation; it 
thus provides a low level of protection for depositors and other creditors. It is available only 
whenthe bank has lost Tier 1 capital. Tier 2 capital generally includes items like therevaluation 
reserves and other provisions. Tier 2 capital is bifurcated into upper and lower components; the 
former having no fixed maturity while the latter has limited life span making it less effective as 
buffer against losses. Also, there are some restrictions on Tier 2 capital; its upper part cannot be 
more tha100%and the lower part more than 50% of Tier 1 capital. 
Basel Accords also provide for a Tier 3 capital that consists of short-term low priority 
(subordinated) debt. It can be used to cover market risk losses which Tiers 1 and 2 are 
insufficient to meet. Here we shall restrict the discussion to Tiers 1 and 2 capitals only  
It is prescribed that the CAR should not be less than 4% for tier 1 capital and not less than 
8%for both Tier 1 and Tier 2 combined. It may be noted that capital adequacy ratios even if 
higher than the minimum prescribed do not necessarily make the bank safe. They primarily deal 
only with credit risks to the exclusion of others. For example, risks of loss due to moral hazard, 
or Shari‟ah non-compliance remain uncovered in the CAR calculation. Even so, the ratio 
approach is commendable for the following reasons: 
(a) It provides an easier way of comparing banks across different jurisdictions. 
1
21

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(b) Off -balance-sheet exposures can be easily included in capital adequacy estimates
8
 
(c) Banks are free to carry low-risk liquid assets in their accounts books. 
While one need not find difficulty with the efficacy of the weighting system, the CAR calculation 
side tracks a crucial fact in focusing on the appropriate adjustment of the numerator – the capital 
requirement to maintain the ratio paying little attention to the denominator, the ipso facto root of 
trouble. The leverage lure leads to mounting credit-on-credit expansion and all receivables appear 
on the asset side of the balance sheet magnifying the denominator. Banks cannot keep increasing 
the capital (numerator) tomatch the credit expansion to hold the ratio intact. Instead the pressure 
may lead to „watering‟ the stocks or reduce the assets volume through undervaluation or 
excessive depreciation to use the accounting terms. 
To meet the criticism,one can possibly argue that the pressure for maintaining the ratio-imposed 
capital adequacy, banks would have to restrict credit expansion. But such restrictioncarries the 
potential of hitting the economy adversely on growth and employment fronts. Unwittingly, it 
might trigger the same sort of crises itwas intended to stop. Basel Accords neglect this side of the 
story. The solution of the problem lies in curbing leverage lure directly. This demands a review of 
the traditional instruments the Central Banks use for credit control to limit leverage gains
9
. The 
review must focus on the fast growing adverse impact of public policy on monetary practice. The 
collapse of mighty banks and the spread of state bankruptcies in the wake of recent turmoil are 
not accidental; the public policy dimension is quite visible; autonomy of the Central Banks is 
being corroded. 
With the foregoing background developments, we may proceed to examine the basic 
provisionsofvarious Basel Accords, to understand their content thrust and implications in the 
context of Islamic banks operating in a dual financial system. 
 
 
Basel I (1988) 
Soon after the formation of the Basel Committee, its members began to discuss the contours of a 
formal standard regarding the appropriate capitalization of internationally active banks. They 
noted that some such banks took advantage of jurisdictional differences to escape the regulators, 
                                                          
8The assets (and liabilities) of banks and other financial institutions are recorded in their balance sheets. However, the distinction 
between what are called off-balance sheet assets and on balance sheet assets is not exclusive. At times, on-balance sheet assets 
may become off-balance-sheet assets and vice versa; it all depends on managerial decisions. How, then, do we explain the term 
„off-balance-sheet assets‟ and how are such assets different from „on-balance-sheet assets‟?  
    The essential difference is that on-balance-sheet assets form part of the asset side total of the balance sheet, 
whereas off-balance sheet assets remain outside this total. However, this need not convey that off-balance-sheet 
assets are not shown on the balance sheet; they are recorded there. Let us illustrate. Broadly, the following situations 
give rise to off -balance-sheet assets: a) Debts that the bank advances to clients are included in its on-balance-sheet 
assets, but if the same debts are securitized and sold to third parties, they cease to be the assets of the bank. 
However, the bank may still manage the securities thus created for its customers. They become off -balance-sheet 
assets for the bank but are recorded in the form of a note in the balance sheet. Similar situations may arise in case of 
some liabilities also  
     It may be mentioned here that as Islam does not allow the securitization of debts, they remain off the balance 
sheet except in Malaysia, where bay’al-dayn(sale of debt) is allowed. 
9
Hasan (2014, 44 – 53) reviews current measures used for credit control and proposes a technique for limiting the 
leverage gains in a dual banking framework. 
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they even moved their activities to locations where the rules were not so stringent. The petro-
dollar boom had virtually ended and the financial sector was in the grip of the resultant crises of 
the 1980s. The circumstances pushed the issue of banks‟ capitalization to the top of Committee‟s 
program priorities. Long negotiations among the members led to the announcement of the first 
Basel Accord in 1988. 
 
This Accord was simple and straightforward as it was essentially an agreement between the 
Basel Committee members and was initially applicable only to those of their banks that were 
operating at the international level outside the parent country. The Accord received prompt 
acceptance not only from the Basel country banks, ut also from other global institutions. Basel I 
divided the capital of banks into two tiers on the basis of differences in the quality of their 
underlying assets, as already discussed above. Each of the two tiers was assigned a 4% risk 
weight that considered only creditrisk, leaving out others, thus making the overall CAR equal to 
8%.As this ratio wasintended to define the minimum, not the optimal capital requirement for a 
bank, it was assumed that the well-capitalized banks would go in for higher ratios in order to 
cover the market and operational risks or currency exchange risks that the Accord had left out. It 
also did not cover the banks that were not operating outside the member countries. One often-
mentioned aspect of Basel I the four pillars on which it stands. The first pillar is the constituents 
of capital – Tier 1 and Tier 2 - that we have already explained.  
The second pillar is the Risk-weighting system which constitutes a comprehensive process of 
assigning weights to various bank assets. It mentions five risk categories that cover all assets on 
the balance sheet of a bank over a 0-5 points range. The specification for an asset depends on the 
discretion of a country‟s central bank. It seeks to take advantage of closer proximity between 
banks‟ capital and the risk exposure of its assets. 
The third pillar is a Target Standard Ratio. It ties together the first and the second pillars of the 
Accord.Itsets a universal standard stipulating that 8% of a bank‟s risk weighted assets must be 
covered by Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital reserves. Additionally, Tier 1 capital must cover 4% of a 
bank‟s risk weighted assets. This ratio is taken as specifying the minimum safety limit for a 
bank.  
Finally, the forth pillar - Transitional and Implementing Agreements–sets the stage for putting 
Basel Accords into operation. It requires the Central Bank of each country to ensure that Basel 
Accords are implemented. The Central Banks across countries are requested to erect a strong 
surveillance and enforcement system to ensure that Basel Accords were observed and that the 
transitional weights are provided to the Committee so that it could adopt the same over a four 
year period in place of the Accord standards. 
Criticism 
     By the year 1999 all countries including China, Russia and India had adopted the Accord 
provisions. Even so, Basel 1 Accord has attracted much criticism. Put briefly. The main points 
raised are as follows. First, Basel I focused its attention only on credit risk to the exclusion of 
others no less important and restricted the application of its recommendations to G-10 countries. 
Also, it covered not allthelocalbanks but only those which were also operating outside their 
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country. Second, due to haste the Committee showed in the implementation of its 
recommendations, banks were not always able to translate them into language easily understood 
by the wide ranging clientele; this hindered the popularization of the recommendations. Third, 
even as the G-10 countries had already in place for long-term growth most of basics that Basel I 
required, the regulators there saw in the overdoing of its recommendations a discrimination 
against their mega private banks; they began to demand extension of the Accord across the globe 
to all including emerging markets. Finally, the Accord provided leeway for banks to apparently 
maintain a low risk profile, while they could indulge in taking much higher risks. To illustrate, 
the gap between the short-term and long-term debt weighting was in the 1:5 ratio and the banks 
could easily convert short term debt into the long-term through the technique of maturity 
transformation. The weighting system in implementation also contained an incentive for banks to 
shuffle the geographical locations for their operations. We shall see that subsequent Basel 
Accords did take notice of such criticisms and changes were made to plug the loopholes. 
 
Basel II (2004) 
The limitations of the Basel I Accord surfaced over the years and the criticism of its 
recommendations led the BaselCommittee to revise the standards of capital adequacy for 
internationally active banks.The Basel II Accord was published in June 2004 and was titled as 
the international Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised 
Framework. The framework was further amended in July 2005. Basel II greatly expands the 
range, depth and technical aspects of the original Accord. This is done essentially by revising 
and revamping its pillars. 
1. Taking note of the Basel I criticism for the first pillar Basel II makes the measurement of 
a bank‟s risk-weighted assets more sensitive and candid closing the loophole the earlier 
Accord contained. A bank now cannot conceal risk-taking through a transfer of assets to 
subsidiaries or combing branch assets into a composite whole for the bank. Changes have 
also been made in the weighting scheme incorporating the Rating Agencies‟ evaluation of 
assets into the picture. For example, A+ to BB+ debt is weighted at 50% while all debt 
rated below B- is risk-weighted at 150%. Pillar 1now covers not only the credit risk but 
others also. The Accord now provides risk-weightings for all other market based assets. Its 
strategy covers stocks, commodities, currencies, and mixed instruments where weight 
assignment is based on a separate set of methodologies 
A special feature of the Pillar relates to the provision of protection against operational 
risks; it requires the creation of a Reserve Pool out of profits. Of the three methods 
proposed for the purpose, the Standardized Approach looks simpler and operational. The 
method identifies business lines of a bank and the percentage each line‟s profit should 
contribute to the reserve in cash form. 
 
2. Pillar 1 seeks to quantify the reserve banks would need to cover market risk arising due to 
the fluctuations in asset prices. For this it makes a distinction between fixed income assets 
like bonds and other sources such as equity, commodities and currencies where income is 
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could be fluctuating. Implicitly, it separates the two components of the overall market risk: 
interest rate risk and volatility risk. 
For fixed income assets, the risk evaluation is the “value at risk” estimation (VAR). It is a 
complicated technique. Therefore, for banks that cannot do not want to implement the 
VAR, Pillar 1 recommends the creation of a reserve tied to the asset maturities 
forprotecting their fixed income assets against interest rate variations. Box 3  
 
3. Compared to pillar I of Basel II Accord, its Pillars 2 and 3 are much less complicated.  
Pillar 2 essentially deals with the Regulator-bank relations. Regulators have the right 
supervise the bank; they can even liquidate a bank if needed. They have the power to 
oversee the internal risk evaluation procedures implementing the provisions the pillar 1 
specifies. They also have the discretion to change or amend these provisions in the light of 
local requirements, especially if they find that a bank cannot manage its credit, market and 
operational risks.  
Pillar 2 indeed enhances the powers of the regulators considerably. Regulators are now 
allowed to create a “buffer” capital facility in addition to the minimum capital requirement 
if banks are found attempting to avoid pillar I provisions. The regulators are allowed to 
take appropriate action to pre-empt the oncoming crises  in countries like China and Korea 
in case capital reserves tend to fall below the minimum. 
4. Pillar 3 seeks to improve market discipline within a country‟s banking sector. In this 
regard the Accord makes a rather revolutionary proposal – to make available for public 
gaze some of the information regarding the banking structure and performance until now 
available only to the regulators. 
 
Basel III (2010–11) 
Building on and carrying forward the Basel II framework, the BCBS made public its third 
Accord, popularly known as Basel III, in 2010–11. The Accord was planned for introducing it 
over the period from 1 April 2013 until 31 March 2018. The Basel III Report is a 
comprehensive document focusing on the consistency of risk weightings for banking assets 
generated. The salient features of the Accord are briefly as follows: 
 
• Capital requirements: In addition to raising the capital requirement ratios for both the tiers, 
Basel III introduces two more capital buffers:  
i. A 2.5% capitalconservation obligatory buffer, and  
ii. A counter-cyclical buffer, which would allow national regulators to require up to another 
2.5% of capital during periodsof high credit growth. The adoption of this proposal is not 
compulsory. 
• Leverage ratio: Basel III introduces a minimum leverage ratio which is calculated by dividing 
Tier 1 capital by the bank‟s average total assets. The banks are expected to maintain a 
leverage ratio in excess of 3%. In July 2013, the US Federal Reserve Bank announced that the 
minimum leverage ratio would be 6% for eight system important financial institutions and 5% 
for their bank holding companies. A system important financial institution (SIFI) could be a 
10 
 
bank an insurance company or some oyher financial institution which if fails may trigger a 
financial crisis. 
• Liquidity requirements: Basel III introduced two obligatory liquidity ratios. One is the 
liquidity coverage ratio that requires a bank to hold sufficient high-quality liquid assets to cover 
its total net cash outflows over 30 days. 
The other is the net stable funding ratio that requires the available amount of stable funding to 
exceed the amount needed to cover a one-year period of extended stress, i.e. the exposure of 
bank capital levels to turbulent economicand financial scenarios. Thus, Basel III tightens the 
leverage ratio framework and disclosure requirements for the banks and other financial 
institutions to enforce discipline in the wavering financial markets.  
 
 
4. Basel Accords and Islamic finance 
 
Islamic finance operates as an integral part of the global financial system. Assuch, Islamic banks 
have to fall in line with international regulations as and whenenforced. This adds to a 
unidirectional convergence of the systems (Hasan 2011).  The Basel Committee Accords on 
capital adequacy measures have forced the pace of such convergence. Basel I was narrowly 
focused on the banks of the Committee member countries and was of little consequence 
forIslamic banks. Basel III recommendations are in the process of being implemented over a 
time span. Thus, it is Basel II standards that demand consideration in the present context. These 
standards have blanket reach, covering banks across theglobe. Islamic bankers and jurists found 
some of the prescriptions of the Accord in compatible with the nature of Islamic banks‟ 
portfolios. For instance, the equity estimation for Islamic banks must include not only the bank 
owners‟ stake but alsothe investment deposits involved in participatory contracts. 
Since the aim of these Accords is to have an adequate level of capital available in  a bank for risk 
management, the following discussion is contextual to the risk-weighting of assets. It is also 
important to mention that in the calculation ofrisk-weights, banks have the choice of adopting the 
Basel II framework for thecalculation of capital adequacy or the internally set standards, with its 
approval. 
The choice has allowed the central banks of countries to modify standards to accommodate their 
domestic requirements. For example, in 2007 the Reserve Bank of New Zealand simplified its 
explanation and examples of capital adequacy ratios and calculated the same for local banks. 
Various sorts of standards for the Islamic financial institutions are set by the two autonomous 
international institutions –the AAOIFI and the IFSB. The AAOIFI sets the Shari’ah compliance 
standards for entering the Islamic financial markets. The objective is to build the confidence of 
the populace in Islamic finance by ensuring, in addition, the transparency of the transaction and 
protection of the depositors‟ interests. 
 
Malaysian response: Malaysia was in particular quick to see Basel Accords coming and initiate 
measures as though in prior their compliance thanks to the foresight of the BNM. The regulatory 
framework and supervisory structure for financial management had already evolved over time at 
a rather brisk pacecharacteristically remaining focused on pre-emptive and preventive action 
11 
 
aiming at stability and growth of thesector. Arrangements were made to enforce responsible 
business conduct, curb financial waywardness, ensure Shari’ah compliance of contracts, keep 
financial markets orderly and payment systems sound in addition tohaving tools ready to deal 
with crises when needed. BOX 4from the Shari,ah Governance (SG)Framework provides the 
constituents of the paraphernalia. There is neither the need nor the space here to discuss the 
provisions or the implications of the listed laws for Islamic banking. Suffice to say they 
harmonize well with the  
 
BOX 4 
Malaysia’s legal system for regulating  
Islamic financial industry  
 
CBA Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 
IFSA Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 
FSA Financial Services Act 2013 
DFIA Development Financial Institutions Act 2002 
Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 
 
 
intention and thrust of the Basel Accords. Their existence verifies that the BNM is not merely the 
central bank but is the bank of Malaysia. It has acted with expedience and faster than most of 
Central Banksin developing countries havedonein testing situations. The BNM has been able to 
harmonize national interests with global demands, especially in the tumultuous years since the 
turn of the century. It has kept the Shari‟ah scholars, academicians and industry players 
continually engaged in meaningful deliberations on various issues relating to the industry. 
Consensual decisions emerged to become the basis of several reforms culminating in the recent 
introduction of the SG Framework As a result for example the on-going imitation of 
conventional products resulting in the erosion of theirShari’ah compatibility, is now frowned 
atanda December 2012 ruling intends at phasing out buy-back of ‘inah’ sale and replace it by 
commoditymurabahahandtawarruq. Most important is the rationalization the SG has executed in 
the organization and role of Shari’ah committees: the number of their members has been raised 
from 3 to 5, the frequency of their meetings has been increased, the scope of their participation in 
management is enhanced and they are given greater operational independence. It is suggested 
that the voting and non-voting distinction among the members may also be abolished. 
    The supervisory role of the Shari’ah Advisory Council of BNM (SACoBNM) is expanded to 
become the apex authority for the ascertainment of applied Shari‟ah in IBF. The Central Bank 
has already demonstrated the value of the 2009 Central Bank of Malaysia Act. This has been 
followed by the introduction of the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 which probably is the 
most comprehensive legislation the industry has ever seen worldwide. Supervision, audit, and 
research have all been revamped.The SG introduced not only the two tiers for capital 
adequacyalsoinitiated measures that aimed at ensuring a „robust risk management control process 
and internal research capacity‟ I n this context, a liquidity management corporation has recently 
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been established. In the same vein the IFSB has recently announced two more standards for 
Islamic financial institutions to strengthen regulation of Islamic banks at the global level. 
IFSB-15: Standard has revised Capital Adequacy for Institutions offering Islamic Financial 
Services excluding the Takāful Institutions and Islamic Collective Investment Schemes (IIFS). 
The revision has enhanced the version of two previous standards namely IFSB-2 of 2005 and 
IFSB-7 of 2007 dealing with requirements for Sukūk, Securitizations and Real Estate 
Investments (2009). It is worth noting that IFBS-15 also adopts Basel III proposals on capital 
components and macro prudential tool for the IIFS. The Standard would help implement a 
capital adequacy framework that will ensure effective coverage of risk exposures of the IIFS 
and allocation of appropriate capital to cover these risks.  
For this purpose, IFSB-15 provides guidance on the features and criteria for high-quality 
regulatory capital components, including Additional Tier I and Tier 2, to comply with Sharī`ah 
rules and principles. Similarly, the standard also provides new guidance on macro policy tools, 
such as capital buffers, leverage ratio and important local banks, which will facilitate supervisory 
authorities in achieving the goal of protecting the banking system and the real economy from 
system-wide shocks. Supervisory authorities among the IFSB member countries are expected to 
start the implementation of IFSB-15 in their respective jurisdictions by January2015.  
      Basel III is designed for staggered implementation over time. The span gave it flexibility and 
space for adjusting with changing needs and circumstances. Another welcome feature is that 
countries can adjust capital adequacy requirements to suit local conditions.  
     Unfortunately Basel III came on the scene when costs are rising and returns on capital are 
falling. Critics were quick to argue that the step would hinder the growth rates ignoring 
thatbumpyrides may also cause slower rates. In Europe, regulators ignoring such apprehensions 
are insistenton implementing the Basel Accords. Smaller banks are likely to gain. Indeed, part of 
the criticism emanates from ideological commitment to free markets. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The main objective of this paper was to improve the understanding of Basel Accords, their thrust 
and implications which objectives have presumably been met. On a more important side, we find 
that  theBasel accords need not create any special difficulty for adoption in the Islamic section of 
global finance because they largely aim at achieving risk mitigation and stability: objectives that 
Shari‟ahalso supports. Furthermore, the Accords contain flexibility to meet local and Islamic 
norms.Also, the greater role to regulators the Accords grant must be taken as a boon for the 
financial industryincluding its Islamic segment. 
    However, Basel Accords are lopsided to the extent that they exclusively focus on the 
numerator – the capital and its tiers – in calculating the capital adequacy ratios. But the 
denominator that includes receivables resulting from the creation of credit-on-credit seems to be 
the main culprit in the crisis generation. Based on the fractional reserve principle, the credit 
creation power of the banking system as a whole is indeed vast. It is the major source that fuels 
speculation and fans the leveraging lure. The impact is devastating. Insistence on capital 
adequacy is welcome but it may not deliver unless credit control measures are revamped and 
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expanded to curb effectively the leverage gains as explained in Table 1. Islamic banking has an 
in-built safeguard against the danger as maintaining linkage with the real economy in all its 
transactions is obligatory. 
The increasing dominance of the waywardness fiscal compulsions over the monetary expedience 
cannot also be ignored. 
The Malaysian SG Framework is work-in-progress and what we have seen so far are positive 
developments introduced mainly in response to informed opinion and demand at the national and 
international levels
10
. The 2013 Survey Report the IFSB is also a well-placed consolidation of its 
position on standards. Interestingly, the Survey negates the much cherished thought that Islamic 
finance was not much affected by the current crisis. The following Figure 4 is self-explanatory. 
 
Shrinkage of GDP and trade is the conduit not so much the financial markets. 
The recent developments in Islamic finance operations seem progressively dissolving into the 
mainstream currents. Not a few perceive that its Islamic character is being eroded. Most of Basel 
recommendations are so far welcome but the situation may not remain so in future. The 
composition of the BCBS is exclusive in terms of its membership– G10+Spain. The membership 
of the organization must be expanded to include members from the developing countries 
including Muslim where Islamic finance is concentrated and is going to be dominant in course of 
time. The call for expansion is logical and democratic; it will enhance confidence and 
transparency. 
      Finally, no policy whatever be the standard is worth more than what it is in implementation. 
Money does not create any problems; its mismanagement does. And management to succeed 
demands a minimal of honesty, transparency and equity to make policies achieve their 
                                                          
10See the opener of Chapter 12, „Islamic Banking and Finance – An integrative approach by Zubair Hasan, Oxford 
University Press January, 2014.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Islamic Banking global growth trends 
Source: IFSB Survey Report 2013 (Modified) 
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objectives. That minimal is unfortunately missing everywhere. The claim the Islam can do the 
trick is valid but can present day Muslims do it carries a big question mark unless demonstrated. 
 
Appendix 1 
Basel Accords: calculation of the capital adequacy ratio for banks 
 
Capital Adequacy ratio expresses the amount of a bank‟s capital as a percentage of its risk-weighted 
credit exposures. The Accords define two types of capital for the purpose and a separate adequacy ratio is 
calculated for each before they are added up to obtain the overall ratio. The two capital types are called 
Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital. The calculation of each Tier requires making of some adjustment to its 
amount shown on the balance sheet of the bank.  
 
     In general Tier 1 capital includes: 
 
 Ordinary share capital of the bank or equity  
+ 
 Revenue reserves such as audited retained earnings 
- 
 Current year‟s losses  
 Future tax benefits and 
 Intangible assets such as goodwill. 
 
Tier 2 capitalhas two components – upper and lower 
 
Upper component 
 
This generally includes 
 
 Unaudited retained earnings  
 Revaluation Reservesbt 
 General provision for bad debts 
 Irredeemable cumulative preference shares  
 Perpetual subordinate debt (It has  no maturity date and  
ranks last among the creditors for payment) 
 
Lower component 
 
Generally, this component includes: 
 
 Subordinated debt with at least a five year term 
 Redeemable preference shares that remained unpaid for not less than 5 years.        
 
 
Total Capital is the sum of Tier I and tier 2 capital minus the following items 
 
 Equity investments in the subsidiaries 
 Shareholdings in other banks beyond 10% of that bank‟s capital. 
 Unrealized revaluation losses on securities holdings.  
 
                          Table 1Calculation of capital illustrated (Figures in billion USD imaginary) 
Tier 1 Tier 2 
Ordinary share capital (Equity) 7 Upper 
Audited retained earnings 8 General bad debt provision 2 
Less: Goodwill -3 Revaluation reserve 4 
  Lower 
  Subordinated debt 2 
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  Redeemable preference shares 3 
  Shareholding in other banks -3 
Total tier 1 capital 12 Total tier 2 capital 8 
TOTAL CAPITAL        12 + 8 20 
 
Having explained and illustrated the calculation of capital needed for the numerator of the CAR, let us 
see how the denominator is set. In other words how the credit exposures are estimated. The important 
feature of the calculation here is that it takes note not only of entries on the balance sheet of a bank but 
of off balance sheet deals as well. Table 2 summarizes the risk weight assignments used for the 
purpose.     
 
On balance sheet exposures 
Risk 
weight % 
Off balance sheet exposures 
Risk 
weight % 
Cash 0 Direct credit substitutes
a 
100 
Short term claims on government 0 Asset sale with recourse 100 
Log-term claims on government (> 1 yr.) 10 Commitment with certain drawdown
b 
100 
Claims on banks 20 Transaction related contracts
c 
50 
Claims on public sector entities 20 Underwriting / sub-underwriting facilities 50 
Residential mortgages 50 Other commitments with an original  50 
All other credit exposures 100 Short-term trade related contingencies 20 
  Other commitments original maturity >1 yr. 0 
 
Note 1 
 
a. Guarantees, Bills of exchange and letters of credit are examples of direct substitutes. 
b. For example include such items as forward purchases and partly paid shares. 
c. For example performance bonds, bid bonds fall in this category.  
 
Note 2 
 
The last category of the off-balance sheet – other commitments – covers current exposures including interest ratecontracts and 
foreign exchange contracts are assigned separate risk-weights.   
 
Table 3: Calculation of risk-weighted exposures 
On-balance sheet Off-balance sheet 
Exposure type Amount 
Risk-
weighting 
% 
Risk-
weighted 
exposure 
Exposure type Amount 
Risk-
weighting 
% 
Risk-
weighted 
exposure 
A B C D = B x C E F G H = F x G 
Cash 15 0 0 Guarantee 10 100 10 
5-yr. Gov. stock 20 10 2 Asset sale (Recourse) 18 100 18 
Lending to banks 30 20 6 Forward purchase 23 100 23 
Home loans 52 50 26 Performance bond 8 100 8 
Commercial oans 65 100 65 Underwriting facility 28 100 28 
Fixed assets 31 100 31 Trade contingency 31 100 31 
    Forward FX contract 5 20 1 
    Interest rate swap 5 20 1 
Total   130    120 
TOTAL RISK WEIGHTED CAPITAL: 130 + 120 = 250 
 
Calculation of Capital Adequacy Ratios: 
 
Tier 1 capital to total risk-weighted exposures =12 divided by 250 
                                                  = 4. 32 % 
Total capital to total risk-weighted exposures  = 20 divided by 250 
                                                  = 8 %  
Acknowledgement: This Appendix 1 is based on Reserve Bank of Canada document (2007): Capital 
adequacy ratios for banks – simplified explanation and example of calculation, downloaded 1-9 from: 
http://www.rbnz.gov.nz/finstab/banking/regulation/0091769.html  Accessed on May 15, 2014 
16 
 
References 
 
 
Alex Roussos (January 23, 2013): Life under Basel III: What will capital markets products look 
like now? Islamic Finance News, Volume 10, Issue 03. PP. 1-4. 
 
Allen et al (2012): Basel III: Is the cure worse than the disease? International Review of 
Financial Analysis 25, 159–166. 
 
Basel Committee on Banking & Supervision (2012):Basel III regulatory consistency 
assessment (Level 2) Preliminary report:European Union  
 
Bryan J. Balin (May 2008): Basel I, Basel II and emerging markets – A nontechnical analysis. 
John Hopkins University, USA 
 
EckartKoemal and Mass Riyaz Malik (20 July, 2012): Basel III – Is the Islamic Finance industry 
ready? Islamic Finance News, Volume 8, Issue 29. PP. 1-3 
 
Hasan, Zubair (2014): Islamic Banking and Finance- An integrative approach,Oxford University 
Press.  
 
Hawser, Anita (May 7, 2014): Islamic finance: Islamic banking by the book, Global Finance 
Magzine: http://www.gfmag.com/contributors/anita-hawser/%3Fpage%3D3 Accessed 26.5.2014 
  
Islamic Finance News (March 26, 2013): Case Study –Abu Dhabi Bank leads the waywith the 
world’s first Basel III, From Deal of the Year Handbook, March 26, 2013, PP. 1-4. 
 
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB): Stability  Report 2013  
 
Kamali, Hashim M (2014): Opener for Chapter 12 in Hasan Z (2014) 
 
Reserve Bank of New Zeland (2007): Capital adequacy ratios for banks-simplified explanation 
and example of calculation. http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/finstab/banking/regulation/0091769.html  
Accessed on 11/7/2013 
 
 
